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ABSTRACT 
It has been widely recognized that RFID related technologies will greatly improve the visibility, the efficiency and the 
collaboration of industry supply chain. In this new “product driven“ supply chain scenario, manufacturer, supplier, and 
third party share and coordinate the use of diverse resources in distributed “virtual organizations”. It challenges the 
security issues, which demand new technical approaches. In collaboration with researchers in Auto-ID Labs China, we 
have developed a service-oriented framework based on CA and Web Services, which supports inexpensive mediation of 
product information among rapidly evolving, heterogeneous information sources. Our architecture defines a user-driven 
security model that allows users to create entities and policy domains within virtual organizations. We emphasize that 
standard Web Services tools and software provide both stateless and stateful forms of secured communication.  
 




Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a powerful new 
technology that is helping companies to improve 
visibility into their inventory data and increase accuracy 
across supply chain networks. When RFID tags are 
attached to products, boxes, and pallets, the items can be 
followed automatically as they move, providing a 
real-time and accurate view of inventory[1]. The 
technology is so effective that organizations such as 
Wal-Matt, Metro, and the U.S. Department of Defense 
now require their suppliers to deliver goods with RFID 
tags. 
 
The Auto-ID Center in MIT, was launched in late 1999, 
has developed RFID tags which are cheap enough to be 
disposable and readers which are agile enough to de 
deployed globally[2]. According to Auto-ID Center’s 
researching, the various components of the Auto-ID 
infrastructure includes (Figure 1): 
 Hardware – such as RFID tags and readers but also 
including optical readers and other types of sensors. 
 Savant – a software platform for interfacing to 
various types of readers and filtering the data 
generated when the tags are within range of the 
readers. 
 The Electronic Product Code (EPC) – a unique 
identification number for each object – the 
minimum information which must be stored on its 
ID tag. 
 The Object name service (ONS) – an extension of 
the domain name service (DNS), which provides a 
method of converting an EPC into the network 
address of the corresponding networked database, 
which in turn holds the product data for that object. 
 The EPC Information Server ( formerly PML 
Server) – an open standard XML Schema for 
representing information about products and 
communicating this information globally in a 
unified manner, between parties who otherwise 
have disparate databases, data storage formats and 
who use diverse application programs to act upon 
the product data. 
 Control systems – to provide feedback into the 
supply chain or manufacturing process, using the 




Figure 1 EPC Network Architecture 
Source: Autoidcenter.org 
 
Since each unique object will have a unique identifier, in 
the form of the EPC, each object will become an 
individual, with its own individual history about how it 
passed the through supply chain. In this “product driven” 
supply chain scenario, manufacturer, supplier, and third 
party (like carrier, distribute center) share and coordinate 
the use of diverse resources in distributed “virtual 
organizations”. 
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Let us consider a simple business scenario. The suppliers 
and customers (manufacturers) collaborate by sharing 
information and exchanging plans via the Supplier 
Managed Inventory (SMI) process. The SMI process is a 
supplier-driver replenishment and planning process, 
which is based on min/max stock balance levels, on 
current demand, in-transits and planned shipments.  
 
With RFID enabled, the application now should support 
the handlingof massive amounts of Auto-ID data through 
connectivity with readers, tags, and other devices; and 
integration of high-volumn RFID data with back-end 
business processes. The dynamic and multi-parties  
nature of these environments introduces challenging 
security issues that demand new technical approaches. 
Most of data are sensitive, and every server exposed on 
internet will be attacked, and so on.  
 
 
Figure 2 SMI scenario 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we investigated related work on security web 
service and certificate validation. Then we propose a 
design of security system model, emphases on security 
web service and privilege management infrastructure. 
Finally, we explain function for system and then we 





2. RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 CA-based Trust Model 
 
One commonly used identity token is provided by an 
X.509 public key certificate. An X.509 “public key 
certificate” is defined in ITUT standard [3] as “the public 
key of a user, together with some other information, 
rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private 
key of the certification authority which issued it.” 
[Section 3.3.44] 
 
In practice an X.509 certificate as defined by the PKIX 
X.509 Certificate Profile RFC[] contains a public key, a 
subject name in the form of a multi-component 
Distinguished Name [DN] and a validity period and is 
signed by a trusted third party called a Certification 
Authority (CA). The X.509 certificates are used with the 
TLS(SSL) security protocol to make a secure 
authenticated connection between two parties. X.509 
certificates are exchanged between entities, usually in a 
phase where no security has yet been negotiated (no data 
integrity or confidentiality). The certificates are first 
tested for validity by checking the expiration dates, 
possible revocation, acceptable key usage and if they are 
signed by trusted CA. If the certificates pass all these 
checks their public keys are then used to build a 
challenge handshake to prove that each entity that sent a 
certificate has the corresponding private key. 
 
There are other public/private key based schemes such as 
PGP keys[4], SSH keys [5]and the SPKI [6] keys and 
protocols. The PKIX/X.509 scheme has a smallish set of 
trusted third parties (CAs) to sign identity certificates 
that contain a subscriber’s public key. This improves the 
scaling properties of public key distribution since only 
the CA’s public key needs to be distributed in an 
out-of-band secure manner. Another feature of the 
X.509-TLS infrastructure is that it supports multiple 
independent CAs. In a supply chain, each company may 
choose which CAs it will accept for binding DNs and 
public keys. At this point, most of the current solutions 
allow for short-term proxy certificates, stored with 
unencrypted private keys, to which a user has delegated 
his identity. These certificates are correctly formatted 
X.509 certificates, except that they are marked as proxy 
certificates and are signed by an end entity rather than a 
CA[7].  
 
2.2 XML Web Service Security 
 
The XML security standards define XML vocabularies 
and processing rules. These standards use legacy 
cryptographic and security technologies, as well as 
emerging XML technologies, to provide a flexible, 
extensible and practical solution toward meeting security 
requirements. The XML security standards include XML 
digital signature [8]for integrity and signing solutions, 
XML encryption [9] for confidentiality, XML key 
management (XKMS) [10] for public key registration, 
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location and validation, security assertion markup 
languages (SAML) [11] for conveying authentication, 
authorization and attribute assertions, XML access 
control markup language (XACML) [12]for defining 
access control rules, and platform for privacy preferences 
(P3P) [13]for defining privacy policies and preferences. 
Major use cases include securing web services 
(WS-Security) [14]. 
 
2.3 RBAC Policies in Privilege Management 
 
Role Based Access Controls (RBAC) has generated 
significant interest in the last decade. The main entities in 
RBAC are the users, the roles and the permissions. A role 
can represent a job function, a qualification or expertise. 
A permission represents the right to access a target in a 
particular mode. Roles are assigned to users in a many to 
many relationship, and permissions are granted to roles, 
again in a many to many relationship. There is thus a 
level of indirection between a user and his access rights. 
The benefits of RBAC are widely discussed on lots of 
papers [15]. 
 
Edition 4 of X.509 [3], published in 2001, is the first 
edition to fully standards the certificates of a Privilege 
Management Infrastructure (PMI). X.509 supports 
RBAC by defining role specification attribute certificates 
that hold the permissions granted to each role, and role 
assignment attribute certificates that assign various roles 
to the users. Each role and name component in X.500 
and LDAP [16] is an attribute type, attribute value pair. 
Thus roles and name components are easily 
interchangeable. The user is identified by either his/her 
LDAP Distinguished Name or his public key certificate 
(issuer and serial number). Role assignment ACs may 
point to their corresponding role specification AC via the 
role specification certificate identifier extension. 
 
A policy is defined which states the rules for assigning 
roles to users, and permissions to roles. The policy can 
then be used control the accesses to all the targets within 
the policy domain [17]. In practice, now we have APIs 
that reads in the XML Policy, parses it, and the uses it to 
control access to targets within the policy domain. The 
API caller, typically an application gateway, passes the 
authenticated name of the user, and this is used to 
retrieve the user’s attribute certificates (ACs) from the 
configured directory (In most case, LDAP server is used). 
The API caller passes the user’s requested action on his 
chosen target, and again this is checked against the policy. 
The API returns either granted or denied to the caller. 
 
3. SECURITY MODEL FOR RFID-ENABLED SCM 
 
We now turn to outline the proposed structure of a 
prototype SSS (SCM Security Server). 
 
Web services technologies allow software components to 
be defined in terms of access methods, bindings of these 
methods to specific communication mechanisms, and 
mechanisms for discovering relevant services. Now, the 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) and the Web 
Services Description Language (WSDL) are widely used 
in many applications. 
 
SSS defines standard Web service interfaces and 
behaviors that add to Web services the concepts of 
stateful service and secure invocation, as well as other 
capabilities needed to address RFID-specific 
requirements. These interfaces and behaviors define what 
is called a “SSS Service” and allow users to manage the 
web service’s life-cycle, as allowed by policy, and to 
create sophisticated distributed services.  
 
Our SSS security model casts security functions as SSS 
services. This strategy allows well-defined protocols and 
interfaces to be defined for these services and permits an 
application to outsource security functionality by using a 





Figure 3 SSS for RFID enabled SCM 
 
The security services include the following. 
 Certificate Validation service (CAS): A service 
that handles the details of processing and 
validating the binding among the subject identity, 
the subject public key, and subject attributes. 
 Authorization service: A service that evaluates 
policy rules regarding the decision to allow the 
attempted actins based on information about the 
requestor, and details of the request. 
 Identity Management service: A service that takes 
a user’s identity in one domain and returns the 
identity in another (e.g between X.509 and 
Kerberos). 
 Archiving and Recovery: A service that archiving 
and recovery of encryption keys. 
 Administration Service: provide administration 
workflow with approval and escalation controls. 
 Overall Audit: A service that securely logs 
relevant information about events. 
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For example, SSS perform path validation on a 
certificate chain according to the local policy and with 
local PKI facilities, such as certificate revocation (CRLs) 
or through an OCSP(Online Certificate Status Protocol). 
The SSS client generates an ‘SSS validate’ request. This 
is essentially asking the SSS server to go and find out the 
status of the server’s certificate. Then the SSS server 
performs a series of validation tasks. After certificate 
status is determined, SSS server replies to client 
application with status of the server’s certificate and 
application acts accordingly. We use CA database 
connection protocol for the purpose of that the server 
obtains real-time certificate status information from CAs. 




Figure 4 Identify Service 
 
4. PMI IMPLEMENTATION 
 
There are three main components to the PMI 
implementation – the authorization policy, the privilege 
allocator (PA) and the PMI application programming 
interface (API). 
 
4.1 Authorization Policy  
 
The authorization policy specifies who has what type of 
access to which targets and under what conditions. The 
xml.org published a document type definition (DTD) for 
the X.500 PMI RBAC policy. It provided a 
meta-language that holds the rules for creating the XML 









The SOA creates the authorization policy for the domain 
using his or her preferred XML editing tool and stores 
this in a local file to be used later by the PA. 
 
 
4.2 Privilege Allocator 
 
The SOA uses the PA to allocate roles to users in the 
form of role-assignment ACs. In the simple case of RFID 
supply chain, there are two roles – ASN issuer and ASN 
receiver. Issues can download any ASN that are 
produced.  
 
Once the role-assignment ACs have been created by the 
PA, they are stored in a LDAP directory.  
 
Another function of the PA is to create an authorization   
policy that is signed digitally as a policy AC. The policy 
AC is a standard X.509 AC. The PA prompts the SOA for 
the name of the policy fiel and then it copies the contents 
into the attribute value. After the SOA has signed the 





A standard authorization   API has already been 
defined by the Open Group in 2000. It is called the AZN 
API and is specified in the C language. It is based on the 
ISO 10181-3 access control framework and specifies the 
interface between the access control enforcement 
function (AEF) and the access control decision function 
(ADF). 
 
We rewrite the AZN API with Object-Oriented method, 
and select Java language for development. After these 
works, the application gateway use API to “construct” 
and PMI Java Object, and complete the work by invoke 
the methods of this object. The main methods include: 
GetCreds, Decision, and Shutdown. 
 
When a user initiates a call to the target, the AEF 
authenticates the users, then passes LDAP DN to the 
ADF through a call to GetCreds. The ADF uses this DN 
to retrieve all role ACs of the user from the list of LDAP 
URIs (“pull mode”). The role ACs are validated against 
the policy e.g. to check that the DN is within a valid 
subject domain, and to check that the ACs are within thje 
validity time of the policy etc. Once the user has been 
successfully authenticated he will attempt to perform 
actions on the target. At each attempt, the AEF passes the 
subject object, the target name, and the attempted action 
along with its parameters, to the ADF via a call to 
Decision. The Decision method will return “Granted” or 
“Denied” after executing the checking. 
 
Shutdown method is designed to used in dynamically 
deploy new policy in domain. The AEF can follow the 
call to Shutdown with a new Constructor call, and this 
will cause the ADF to read in the latest policy and be 




The first demo system for SSS has been implemented 
based on the design described in previous section. Some 
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open source projects are used in the demo system, like 
Tomcat, Apache SOAP, openCA, and so on. The security 
API depends core Java security technology, includes 
Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS), 
Java Cryptography Extensions (JCE) and Java Secure 
Socket Extensions (JSSE). 
 
Security service is complicated system. From the running 
result, there are many works to do in the future. We 
should consider the performance on the real Internet 
environment. We need add more robust integration with 
exist system. And next step, the private keys are 
generated in the Tags or cards, they can be used as soon 




RFID technology is changing the way organizations 
manage their supply chain networks. With RFID, 
inventory data becomes more transparent and more 
accurate, enabling organizations to speed up delivery, 
respond more quickly to customer demand. But 
integrating RFID into existing systems has been 
prolematic, especially, it let suppliers, manufacturers, 
and customers become a virtual organization across the 
unsafe internet. We propose a security approach on open 
web service to validate certificate based on current web 
security environment, and a privilege management 
infrastructure used in collaborative business scenario Our 
approach will be a model for the future security system 
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